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Summary 
The conventional PSE’s methodology doesn’t provide adequate estimation of 
agricultural support for the economy in transition. In this paper we attempt to adjust 
PSE’s methodology for Russian economy, and also coefficients’ analysis and 
interpretations are adapted for transitional conditions. Investigation showed that the 
level of agricultural support in Russia is much lower than conventional methodology 
estimates. 
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1 Introduction 
The PSE’s (producer’s support estimate) methodology is used for estimating support 
to agricultural producers since 60-ies. OECD estimates PSE for different countries on 
regular basis since 1987.  
This methodology gave rise to numerous discussions in recent years. By 1998 the 
number and complexity of policy measures in world economy increased significantly. 
OECD changed the methodology of estimating PSE in order to evaluate policy impact 
more comprehensively. 
One of the main characteristics of modern world economy is that economies in 
transition begin to play more and more important role in it. Nowadays OECD 
estimates PSE not only for developed economies, but also for transitional ones. 
However, there are some signs of nonadequacy of conventional PSE estimating 
methodology for economies in transition. 
In this paper we discover the imperfection of standard methodology and then we 
attempt to investigate the underlying conditions for conventional methodology failure 
to estimate support to agriculture correctly. We also attempt to adjust PSE’s 
methodology for transitional conditions like the Russian ones, and also coefficients’ 
analysis and interpretations are adapted for transitional economy.   
A problem of estimating the efficiency of budget support to agriculture is very 
important at present time in Russia. It is due to the necessity of elaborating an 
adequate government support policy in agrifood sector.  
The indicators of support like PSE are based on comparison of domestic and the 
world prices for an agricultural product. This method of estimation assumes, that 
without government interventions domestic prices would equal the word prices, in this 
case  considered to be  a sort of equilibrium prices. They are also called reference 
prices. And any deviation  from this equilibrium is produced by government 
interventions. Positive value of gap between domestic prices and reference prices 
means support of domestic producers. Negative gap  means taxation. 
After the transition towards market economy began in Russia, government 
interventions into agricultural markets were not discontinued, though transformed 
significantly. Nowadays there is no direct regulation of economic activity. The aim of 
government regulation is the correction of economic processes in the market 
environment.  2  PSE estimation, standard methodology 
OECD has been measuring support to agriculture in Russia using producer support 
estimate (PSE) since 1997. (OECD, 1998, 1999). PSE indicates all transfers to 
agricultural producers, both from consumers and taxpayers, arising from policy 
measures. It includes two components: explicit component, or budgetary payments 
and implicit - market price support (MPS). MPS estimates the gap between domestic 
prices and world (reference) prices. Domestic price is measured at farm gate and is 
adjusted on margin to be compared with world price. 
In Soviet period support to agriculture measured by PSE was quite significant – about 
80%. At the beginning of transition, PSE fell and became minus 86% in 1992. (OECD 
estimation). This was caused not only by the fall of government support to agriculture 
accompanied with imports support and export restrictions, but also by changes in 
macroeconomic environment and in particular by sharp devaluation of national 
currency and the lack of infrastructure, which stipulated gap between domestic and 
reference prices.  
Market price support estimation based on OECD data on reference prices and 
Goskomstat data on domestic farm gate prices. Large enterprises, private farm and 
private household prices were calculated separately and then producer price was 
calculated as a weighted average.  
When estimating PSE it is necessary to take into account on-farm feed production to 
avoid double counting. So, excess feed costs were excluded from  livestock PSE. 
Estimation of transfers to producers includes support of both domestically consumed 
and exported commodities. That’s why Goskomstat production balances were used for 
PSE estimation. 
RF Federal Treasury data was used to estimate budgetary payments. (MF, 2001). To 
estimate PSE by commodity budgetary payments per commodity are needed. But in 
Russia most  support programs are not tied to a single commodity, and this data is not 
available. That’s why we estimated subsidy distribution by commodity. Budgetary 
payments were distributed according to the monetary value of  marketed output, like 
in OECD methodology.  
The results of own calculations of PSE for Russian agriculture are presented in  FIG. 
1. Bold line reflects percentage PSE in 1994-2000. The increase of PSE began in 1994 
and became positive in 1996, but it never reached the level of Soviet period. PSE 
increase in this period can be explained by enforcement of protectionist trade 
measures and some shifts in infrastructure development, as well as by the 
overvaluated national currency. PSE fell significantly in 1998, the year of financial 
crisis, and recovered slightly only in 2000.   
PSE increased in 1995 due to sharp growth of explicit budgetary payments. Till 1997 
an overall macroeconomic situation improved and so did PSE (as can be seen in FIG. 
1, MPS component reflecting macroeconomic improvements increased sharply). In 
1998 after financial crisis and rouble devaluation PSE fell despite better situation for 
agricultural producers due to import substitution. The problem of inadequacy of PSE 
methodology in after-crisis conditions will be discussed in the next division.  
In 1999 budgetary payments increased slightly mostly due to greater  role of regional 
budgets in agricultural support. But MPS decreased and then PSE decreased as well. 
The role of MPS in standard PSE methodology increases from year to year in all 
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Source: own calculations. 
PSE by commodity can be found in TAB. 1. It can be noticed that in 1997 –1998 
livestock husbandry was supported more than crop production. That’s due to huge 
explicit budgetary payments to livestock producers during this period while main PSE 
component for crops was market price support, negative for crops till 1996. 
Market price support reflects price gap between domestic and reference prices. It 
appears as a result of government price and trade policy as well as of market 
imperfections and the problem of large economy,  counteracting price leveling on 
domestic and world markets. Asymmetric information, lack of infrastructure and 
imperfect competition (inter-regional barriers and monopoly) are examples of the 
above-mentioned market imperfections.  
For most commodities market price support is negative, and it can’t be compensated 
by budgetary payments that are rather small. Wheat MPS was negative till 1999 and 
wheat producers were taxed instead of being supported. This is a  sign of inefficient 
budget funds’ spending. Explicit budget transfers to maize producers were not large 
either, but maize production support is rather high due to high domestic prices for this 
commodity. World prices were relatively low, and that’s why MPS for maize was 
high too. Potatoes PSE was high in 1996-1997 due to high MPS. White sugar 
production is supported. Other crops were taxed till 2000. In 2000 most crops became 
more supported and meat became less supported. 
TAB. 1.  PSE by commodity, Russia 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Wheat  -57 -31  -2  8 -26 -12  8 
Maize  28 21 34 31  4 13 25 
Rye  -37  7 22 22  -11 -4 40 
Barley  -58 -83  -9  2 -12 -36 -14 
Oats  -57  -38 16 15 -8  -18 13 
Potatoes  -18  -31 60 64  7  -10 -7 
Sunflowers  -77 -12 -22 -30 -59 -38 -48 
White  sugar  -9  -0,2 21 22 37  8 26 
Milk  -28 33 43 52 38 31 44 
Beef  and  veal  -186 -89 -31  29  -7 -74  -117 
Pigmeat  -56  -13 11 28 13 -3  -26 Poultry  8 31 54 65 41 40 29 
Eggs  -1 36 41 51 34  0  5 
Source: own calculations. 
The methods of estimating agricultural support were worked out for agricultural 
policy analysis in developed countries to be applied in stable functioning market 
economy. Therefore coefficients’ analysis and interpretation should be corrected 
taking into account the transition period specifics. In a transition economy generally 
accepted estimation methods are inadequate. That’s why some adjustments should be 
made to apply this methodology in a transition economy.  
3 Transition  economy  specifics  influencing PSE estimation 
There are some specifics of transition economy that make standard methodology 
irrelevant: 
♦  exchange rate instability 
♦  exchange rate nonequilibrium 
♦  lack of market infrastructure 
♦  technological backwardness of processing industry 
♦  inter-regional barriers 
♦  limited and costly information 
♦  finance system inefficiency 
♦  law instability 
♦  debt write-offs 
♦  low domestic prices as Soviet heritage 
♦  slow market signal transmission due to the problem of large economy 
♦  lack of reliable and comprehensive statistics 
3.1  Budget transfers to agriculture  
One of the transition economy problems is the lack of necessary statistical data on 
public expenditures on agriculture. These data need to be collected for estimating 
PSE, but there are some  phenomena that can hardly be estimated quantitatively. It’s 
difficult to assess the effect of credit subsidizing programs because these credits are 
often not paid back and so can be called grants. Thus, in 1992-1994 credits were 
written off. These amounts must be taken into consideration as a subsidy when 
estimating PSE. In transition economy budget payments to agriculture are largely 
delayed. This means implicit taxation of agricultural producers, especially given   
inflation. 
Public spending  on agriculture explicitly includes expenditures on agriculture and 
fishery, as well as land resources management. Agricultural producers’ tax deductions 
constituted 20 mln. roubles (about 1,5% of GDP) and were not included into budget 
expenditures. This is not correct. Credit in-kind wasn’t included either though it 
meant 12 trillion roubles of subsidies to agriculture due to delay of payments to the 
federal budget. Written-off debts in 1994-95 amounted to about 20 trillion roubles. Budgetary payments to agriculture don’t include government investments in food 
industry. 
Essential transfers to agriculture are made from regional budgets. Federal payments 
constitute only about one-third (FIG. 2). And regional budgets are even less 
transparent. As a result of financial crisis in 1998 there wasn’t enough funds for 
financing support in federal budget. That’s why the role of regions in support grew up 
to 86%. In 1999 their role declined while overall support increased as compared  to 
1998, though it was still smaller than in 1992-97. 
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Source: Ministry of finance, Federal Treasury. 
Besides, enterprises are in tax debts to budgets. As a result, information on public 
expenditures on agriculture is irrelevant. 
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Source: Own calculations based on Ministry of finance and Goskomstat data. 
The amount of budget transfers envisaged in draft budget for agriculture is not 
executed. The share of budget support in GDP decreased from 4,48% in 1992 to 0,8% 
in 2000. (FIG. 3). Share of support in GAO reduced as well, but it rose  slightly in 
2000. 
Services constitute large share of budget expenditures. Land resources management 
programs expand. In 1998-1999 about 20% of budget expenditures fell on subsidized 
credit fund. The amount of public investment in agriculture decreases. 
The major  part of budget expenditures can’t be attributed to specific products, that’s 
why PSE calculation by commodity is rather relative. Obviously, budgetary payments to agriculture are necessary for it’s normal operation. 
However, the increase of budgetary payments rarely leads to the improvement of 
producers’ welfare. Federal and regional agricultural policy can lead to the increase of 
explicit transfers to agriculture and at the same time to implicit reduction of 
producers’ receipts or even taxation. PSE reflects this situation when budgetary 
payments (BP) are positive and market price support (MPS) is negative and as a result 
PSE is negative. 
3.2  Exchange rate.  
One of the transition economy’s great problems is exchange rate instability. Exchange 
rate is used in PSE calculation for converting world prices  into national currency. 
That’s why it has direct impact on PSE calculation results. Standard methodology 
offers per year PSE calculations using one-year average exchange rate. In some cases 
exchange rates of the end of the year are used. Obviously, in a transition economy 
where currency rate changes significantly during the year, average rate and the end-
of-the year rate are irrelevant. It would be more adequate to use exchange rates for 
shorter periods. For example, in August 1998 rouble was sharply devaluated  and 
average exchange rate value didn’t  reflect economic processes. Thus, PSE 1998 must 
be calculated separately for two periods: before and after the crisis.  
The second problem connected with exchange rate is national currency over- and 
undervaluation, or exchange rate nonequilibrium. When exchange rate undervalues 
national currency, world prices in national currency are overvalued and PSE shows 
larger taxation of agrifood sector than it really is. This situation often takes place at 
the early stage of transition. When national currency is overvalued  PSE shows greater 
support.  
In the Soviet economy rouble was overvalued. At the beginning of transitional stage it 
was undervalued due to the sharp fall of its rate. Thus, in 1992 rouble’s rate fell 110 
times relative to USA dollar while prices rose only 2,5 times. Then in 1992-1994 high 
inflation rate and  slower rouble devaluation led to the increase of real exchange rate 
that became close to equilibrium. This level remained till 1996.In August 1998 rouble 
was overvalued. 
As a result of financial crisis real exchange rate fell significantly and after August 
1998 rouble was undervalued. This leads to underestimation of support, shown by 
PSE. In 2000 real exchange rate was still lower than before August 1998 but it began 
to approach equilibrium level (FIG. 4). This makes all comparisons of support levels 
irrelevant for this period of non-equilibrium currency rate. World Bank uses Atlas 
conversion factor for equilibrium exchange rate estimations. (World bank, 2001). The 
purpose of the Atlas conversion factor is to reduce the impact of exchange rate 
fluctuations in the cross-country comparison of national incomes.  
The Atlas conversion factor for any year is the average of a country’s exchange rate 
(or alternative conversion factor) in that year and the two preceding years, adjusted 
for the difference between the rate of inflation in the country and that in 5 developed 
countries. 
 Official and adjusted using Atlas conversion factor exchange rates are presented in 
FIG. 4 
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Source: CBR, World Bank. 
In this investigation we calculated PSE using adjusted exchange rate. The results are 
on FIG. 5. In 1994 the adjusted PSE exceeds its original value,  confirming the fact 
that undervalued national currency undervalues support. In 1995-96 adjusted PSE 
doesn’t differ from standard PSE, because exchange rate is close to equilibrium. 
Currency rate influences greatly the competitiveness of agricultural production. For 
example, domestic producers benefit from devaluation since their returns in national 
currency increase. Besides, they gain competitive advantages over imports. However, 
if a producer has debts in foreign currency he will partially lose from devaluation and 
its effect will be eliminated. 
FIG. 5. PSE, adjusted exchange rate 
Source: own calculations. 
After the 1998 crisis Russian agricultural producers’ performance improved despite 
the decrease of budget support. PSE calculated using standard methodology falls 
significantly in 1998. And it doesn’t reflect changes in real support that has increased. 
When we use adjusted exchange rate in PSE calculations, PSE remains at the same 
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In the Soviet economy there was a state monopoly on agricultural output procurement. 
After the 1992 liberalization ties between the government and agricultural producers 
were destroyed and the development of market infrastructure began. However, it is 
still rather backward leading to hither transaction costs and lower domestic production 
competitiveness. As a result, the gap between domestic and reference prices can 
partially be explained by the lack of infrastructure. 
Processing industry in transition economy is highly monopolized. This leads to 
overvalued processing costs for agricultural producers. High transaction costs increase 
producers’ taxation. Technological backwardness in processing industry and bad 
transport infrastructure lead to the increase of transportation and processing costs for 
agricultural producers. 
In Russia inter-regional barriers pose obstacles to exporting output produced in a 
region. In some regions local authorities applied quotation, licensing and total 
exportation prohibition. At the same time they controlled retail prices for agricultural 
products. Producers can’t use arbitrage advantages, they can’t sell on the most 
favorable markets. In these conditions domestic producers can hardly compete with 
imports. Imported goods are delivered to basic markets through highly developed 
distribution system. Inter-regional barriers pose obstacles to foreign trade and lead to 
the increase of price gap. Excessive  domestic costs are also a consequence of 
corruption. 
Lack of infrastructure leads to slow and costly information spreading. There is no 
effective financial system that could ensure fast and inexpensive assess to capital. 
Interest rates are extremely high leading to problems with capital and investment 
attraction not only for agricultural producers but also for processing industry and for 
the economy as a whole. 
Producers need effective legislation to protect their property rights. Permanent and 
unexpected changes in national policy, especially in foreign trade regulation, create 
another problem for producers. Lack of market infrastructure increases financial risks 
and leads to implicit producers’ taxation. Lack of competition on agricultural markets 
leads to the widening price gap. Market prices sometimes are maintained at the level 
above equilibrium. In this case demand falls and some producers have to leave 
marketsince they don’t have an opportunity to sell their products. This increases risks 
in agriculture. 
All transition problems can’t be taken into account  when estimating PSE but some 
inadequacy can be eliminated , for example by using adjusted value of margin. For 
calculating adjusted domestic prices, 50% margin level was taken. But in a transition 
economy this value includes not only processing, marketing and transportation costs, 
but also costs due to the lack of infrastructure  – i.e. high transaction costs, bribes and 
many other things. Higher margin makes domestic price closer to the world price and 
thus, above-mentioned costs are included into the producers' support in PSE 
calculation. Obviously, this leads to the overvaluation of the level of support and 
makes inter-country comparisons inadequate. In this case higher PSE doesn’t 
evidence  better terms for producers due to the elimination of infrastructure defects. 
Thus, to estimate the real impact of agricultural policy on prices one needs to 
distinguish the part of price gap, caused by the lack of infrastructure. One of the ways to do it is to use different margin value. In another country with 
transition economy, Romania, margin level is 30%. We can assume that this value is 
adequate for the Russian economy as well. If we use 30% margin in PSE estimation 
the coefficient reduces significantly and sometimes even becomes negative. In my 
investigation we used adjusted margin value for PSE estimation, better  reflecting 
Russian specifics. FIG. 6 shows PSE given 30% margin.  
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Source: own calculations. 
PSE reflects the improvement of economic situation: rouble strengthening, inter-
regional barriers lowering, interest rates reduction, infrastructure development. When 
we calculate PSE using adjusted margin of 30% we can see that support is still 
extremely low. 
3.4  Other transition economy problems 
Gap between domestic and reference prices shown by MPS can be caused not only by 
explicit and implicit producers’ taxation but also by other factors. Agricultural policy 
analyses must take into account that price level in a transition economy is often lower 
than the world average.  
This can be explained by the specifics of closed economy, where market prices were 
much lower than in market economies (and producer prices were highly subsidized). 
After price liberalization when exchange rate became closer to equilibrium, domestic 
prices became closer to the world prices.However, this is a very slow process, and it 
hasn’t yet come to the end.  
Thus, a part of price gap shown by PSE is conditioned not only by the national 
agricultural policy, but also by lower price level due to closed economy specifics.  
Reference prices, used in OECD methodology, are not absolutely relevant. It would 
be more precise to use average export and average import prices for goods  which 
Russia is a net exporter or a net importer correspondingly. 
4  PSE adjusted. Results and analysis 
This division considers PSE adjusted on for margin and currency rate. PSE adjusted is 
lower than standard PSE in 1995-1997, because government support to agriculture 
(both MPS and BP on FIG. 7) was rather low.Standard methodology overestimates PSE since high MPS during this period reflects not the increase of support but the 
overall economical stabilization. 
In 1998 and 1999 standard methodology underestimates PSE due to the exchange rate 
nonequilibrium during this period. Rouble was undervalued and standard 
methodology showed the reduction of support. However, the competitiveness of 
domestic production and agricultural producers’ performance improved after 1998 
crisis. This led to MPS increase, that is reflected in higher adjusted PSE.  
In 2000 PSE adjusted falls again and MPS is negative. This is the evidence that after-
crisis domestic producers’ advantages are ending. 























































MPS MPS adjusted BP
PSE PSE adjusted
 
Source: own calculations. 
In TAB. 2 we can see the results of adjusted PSE calculations by commodity. It can 
be noticed that for most part of commodities the situation is the same as for 
aggregated PSE: PSE adjusted is higher than standard PSE in 1998-1999 (due to the 
exchange rate adjustment) and lower in other years (due to the exchange rate and 
margin adjustment).  
TAB. 2. PSE adjusted by commodity 
    1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Wheat  PSE%  -57 -31  -2  8 -26 -12  8 
 PSE%adj -55 -51 -18 -16 -16  10  -2 
Maize  PSE%  28 21 34 31  4 13 25 
 PSE%adj 29  9 24 13 12 31 17 
Rye  PSE%  -37  7 22 22  -11 -4 40 
 PSE%adj -35 -7 10  2 -2 17 34 
Barley  PSE%  -58 -83  -9  2 -12 -36 -14 
 PSE%adj -56  -111 -26 -24  -4  -8 -26 
Oats  PSE%  -57  -38 16 15 -8  -18 13 
 PSE%adj -55  -60 4  -7 1 6 4 
Potatoes  PSE%  -18  -31 60 64  7  -10 -7 
 PSE%adj -1  -31 60 61 26 24 -3 
Sunflower  PSE%  -77 -12 -22 -30 -59 -38 -48 
 PSE%adj -74 -29 -41 -65 -47 -10 -64 White 
sugar 
PSE%  -9  0 21 22 37  8 26 
 PSE%adj 7  0 21 15 50 37 29 
Milk  PSE%  -28 33 43 52 38 31 44 
 PSE%adj -26 23 35 39 43 44 38 
Beef and 
Veal 
PSE%  -186 -89 -31  29  -7 -74  -117 
 PSE%adj -182 -117  -51  10  1  -40 -140 
Pigmeat  PSE%  -56  -13 11 28 13 -3  -26 
 PSE%adj -55 -29  -3  9  20  17 -40 
Poultry  PSE%  8 31 54 65 41 40 29 
 PSE%adj 9 23 47 55 45 52 21 
Eggs  PSE%  -1 36 41 51 34  0  5 
  PSE%adj 6 32 37 42 43 20  2 
Sources: own calculations. 
PSE changes can be caused by changes of either  budgetary payments or MPS. PSE 
increase during the period considered and its fall in 1999 are feebly connected with 
the amount of budget transfers and are caused by changes of exchange rate and 
domestic prices. That’s why in case of price and exchange rate instability in a 
transition economy PSE estimated using standard methodology says nothing about the 
real policy impact on agricultural producers. 
Thus, 1994-97 producers’ taxation was due to unfavorable economic situation and 
PSE  fall at the end of this period can be explained by exchange rate approaching  
equilibrium. The policy impact on agricultural producers was extremely insignificant 
and was not responsive to application of  new effective policy measures.  
That’s why it is necessary to decrease direct government interference in agricultural 
sector and to reorient policy to infrastructure development, credit system 
improvement and creation of favorable conditions for investment in agrifood sector. It 
is also very important to stimulate consumers’ solvent demand. 
5  PSE in Russia and in other countries 
The above calculations show that the real support to agricultural producers is low and 
for some commodities is even negative. However, it’s important to estimate not only 
the absolute amount of support but also the respective Russia’s place among other 
countries, especially those in transition. In FIG. 8 individual indicators for countries in 
transition and the OECD average are presented. (OECD, 2001). Russian PSE is 
adjusted for margin and exchange rate instability. In the Soviet period the level of 
support to agriculture in Russia was substantially higher than in the Central and 
Eastern Europe. At the beginning of  reforms it fell sharply and became lower than in 
other countries. In 1997 PSE in Russia exceeded that of other transition countries, but 
was still below the OECD average. In 1998 the level of support in other countries 
increased and became higher than in Russia, where it fell again in 2000.  
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Sources: OECD, own calculations. 
6  Conclusions and policy implications 
It can be concluded from our investigation that the actual level of agricultural support 
in Russia in much lower than conventional methodology reveals. Actually, in 2000 
Russia’s PSE is zero, and this is extremely low value compared with other countries 
in transition. 
Consequently some conclusions can be made that are rather important for Russian 
relationship with other countries. Thus, zero agricultural support gains great 
importance considering the WTO negotiations. WTO restricts support to domestic 
producers, but in Russia the level of support is at the same level as in Australia and 
New Zealand and much lower than in other WTO members. 
At the same time, the level of budget expenditures on agriculture is practically the 
same as in other countries. That’s why it is necessary to modify  the agricultural 
support policy in Russia, so that it would become efficient and would not lead to 
producers’ taxation. 
When budget resources are limited it is especially important to use them efficiently. 
But in Russia policy is rarely efficient since support programs are chosen without 
taking into account specific transition problems. As a result, assets are sometimes 
withdrawn from the agricultural sector. And the effect is often well below the funds 
spent on program. Therefore agricultural policy should take into account Russia’s 
specifics. Budget funds should be spent on market institutions’ development (that at 
present is often hampered by national policy) and property rights’ guaranteeing. 
It is necessary to stop direct interventions and to reduce government activity on 
markets since it discourages private activity in agriculture.  When distributing budget 
funds one should take into account that low effective consumer demand for 
agricultural products is one of the main problems for agricultural producers. Therefore 
national policy should aim at output marketing development. Thus investments in 
food industry could increase the competitiveness of Russian agriculture. Only 
domestically produced goods should be used for government needs, for example army 
and hospitals. Domestic output should also be used in food aid programs. Encouragement of export can also serve to increase demand. Guaranteed export 
credits, improvement of standardization system, government aid in commodities’ 
promotion to foreign markets would be helpful for domestic producers. 
Measures reducing production costs would also stimulate market relations’ 
development. Macroeconomic stabilization, low and stable inflation, exchange rate 
stability, transparent legislation, lessened corruption will lead to agricultural sector 
recovery.  
Direct subsidizing should be replaced by provision of general services, for example 
rural development support,  access to information and creation of favorable 
investment climate. The shift to  general services support would help WTO 
negotiations since the organization doesn't insist on cutting green box measures.  
Government should support non-agricultural employment in rural areas. Nowadays 
almost all agricultural enterprises have redundant employees and it leads to lower 
labor productivity.   
Another problem is the non-transparency of budget expenditures. Budget 
classification doesn't correspond with policy programs applied and doesn't reflect the 
amount of money spent on each measure of support. This makes policy impact 
estimation difficult. Besides, Russian budget classification is not similar to that in 
other countries. Thus, it is difficult to compare domestic and the world budget 
payments. Therefore, more detailed budget classification and better  budget 
transparency are needed, especially for regional budgets. 
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